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RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES: THE NATURE AND
ENFORCEABILITY OF RESIDENTIAL
SEGREGATION BY AGE
Mary Doyle*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades, the retirement community has become
an increasingly important element in the national housing picture,
and demographic and sociological factors indicate that this trend will
continue in the years ahead. The sunbelt states of Florida, Arizona,
and California, which have been traditionally attractive to mobile retirees and thus have been the setting for the first of the retirement
communities, have seen a net increase in their older populations of
well over one-half million persons between 1960 and 1970. 1 Although housing developments of this type were virtually unknown
in California twenty years ago, by 1966 the state had thirty-five retirement communities housing approximately 54,000 persons. 2 Arizona's famous Sun City, located fifteen miles northwest of Phoenix,
has grown from a population of 7,300 in 1965 to 40,000 today, with
a population of more than 55,000 projected for 1980.8 Green
Valley, near Tucson, is expected to grow from 6,000 to 30,000 persons in the next decade. 4 The retirement-community concept has
taken hold in other areas of the country as well, most notably in the
metropolitan states of the northeast. In New Jersey, for example,
there are 30,000 retirement community dwelling units, with an
increase of 15,000 units anticipated in Ocean County alone. 5

* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia; Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona. B.A. 1965, Radcliffe College; LL.B. 1968,
Columbia University.-Ed.
1. K. HEINTZ, RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES 26 (1976).
2. M. BARKER, CALIFORNIA RETIREMENT CoMMUNITIES ix (1966).
3. Interview with Don Tuffs, Assistant Director, Public Relations, Del E. Webb
Development Corporation, in Phoenix, Ariz., July 28, 1977.
4. Arizona Daily Star, June 1, 1975, at 6A, col. 1.
5. K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 16.
Part of the explanation for the rise of the retirement community is demographic.
Life expectancy in the United States has soared from 49 years at the tum of the
century to 71.9 years in 1974, U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECfS OP
AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITllD STATES 25 (1976), and the percentage of the population over 60 years of age has more than doubled in that period,
64
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As used here, the term "retirement community" describes a
planned, age-segregated residential development designed for active
older adults, often with provision for recreational and other appropriate services. 6 Within the rather broad scope of this definition,
retirement communities vary widely in appearance, affluence, organization, and atmosphere. Sun City, for example, is located in an outlying unincorporated area, with housing that consists entirely of detached single-family dwellings designed for the relatively affluent
retiree. Elaborate recreational facilities and opportunities are available, 7 reflecting the developer's plan to provide a way of life rather
than just a place to live. In contrast to that design, but still within
the definition of "retirement community," are smaller age-restricted
developments Jocated within towns and cities that provide their
residents fewer amenities and lower-cost housing. A moderately
priced development might offer mobile-home living, 8 relatively highdensity housing, or a housing mix, and recreational facilities might
be limited to a single swimming pool or clubhouse.
Similar variety may be found in the means by which age segregation is established and in the degree to which age exclusivity is
maintained. Many retirement communities have developed only
from 6.4% in 1900 to 14.8% in 1975, id. at 6. In absolute numbers, the over-60
population is expected to climb from the present 31.6 million to 42 million by the
year 2000, a one-third increase. Id. at 3. Although the Bureau of the Census labels
as "unfounded" reports that within 50 years one-third of the population will be over
65, id. at 10, its prediction is that the proportion of those over 65 will continue to
increase over the next five decades.
A second factor contributing to the growth of the pool of candidates for retirement community living is the concomitant increase in the percentage of older persons
who are retired. About 80% of men over 65 are retired today, a figure made more
dramatic when compared with the 1950 retirement rate of only 50%. See id. at 49.
Additionally, the age for retirement in the United States is steadily falling. Although
age 65 traditionally has marked the career's end and the onset of retirement, census
figures show a marked rise over the past 10 years in the percentage of retirees among
men aged 55 to 64, id. at 50-51. The percentage of retired women in this group
has remained essentially unchanged. Id.
6. The use of the word "retirement" might be misleading. The type of residential
development contemplated here is segregated by age but not by employment status,
so persons of the requisite age are eligible for residence even though they still work.
7. These include six large "recreation centers" containing auditoriums, swimming
pools, arts and crafts rooms, club and meeting facilities, libraries, and large social
halls. The centers provide an extensive social life for residents that is organized
around a panoply of clubs and organizations. Among the more unlikely offerings
are the Handbell Ringers Club, the Sun City Twirlers, and the Sun City Power
Riders, the latter being a group of motorcycle enthusiasts. Other amenities include
medical and shopping facilities, a boarding stable for horses, and nine 18-hole golf
courses.
8. For a description of a typical trailer park for retirees, see Hoyt, The Life of
the Retired in a Trailer Park, 59 AM. J. Soc. 361 (1954).
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after the adoption of a zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to
persons over a certain age, typically fifty-two or fifty-five, with exceptions frequently provided for a younger spouse and one child beyond high-school age. 0 Other communities have achieved the same
ends through reciprocal private covenants imposing residential age
restrictions. Yet another method of effecting residential age segregation operates without benefit of zoning ordinances or restrictive
covenants, relying instead on restrictions that are informally established and privately maintained. An example of this approach is
Sun City, where residence by younger persons or families with children is discouraged by exclusionary marketing policies and by such
planned disincentives as an absence of parks and nearby schools.
As retirement communities have become popular housing alternatives for elderly persons, they have also increasingly gained the
attention of the couvts. More specifically, several state court cases
have arisen in which age-restrictive zoning ordinances have been
challenged on constitutional and statutory grounds. Although the
earliest of those challenges were by and large successful, the most
recent decisions have sustained age-restrictive zoning. Indicative of
the trend is the fact that within the past several years two of the most
respected state tribunals, the highest courts of New Jersey and New·
York, have upheld zoning ordinances that provided for the creation
of retirement communities. 10
There is cause, however, for questioning whether these most
recent cases represent the final judicial verdict on the constitutional
validity of age-restrictive zoning ordinances. First, no federal court
has had occasion to review such an ordinance. Second, and perhaps
more important, the significant state court decisions in this area were
delivered before the Supreme Court's decision in Moore v. City of
9. For example, the court in Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning
Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 237 n.4, 364 A.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (1976), noted that 12 senior
citizen communities in New Jersey had been developed pursuant to age-restrictive
zoning ordinances. Such ordinances may also allow quite limited zoning adjustments--most commonly relaxation of parking requirements--for senior citizen housing developments. Others go further by allowing significant density concessions for
special age-restricted zones.
·
Although as a formal matter it is often the developer filing the rezoning application who requires inclusion of a residential age restriction, the impetus for the
age limitation generally comes from local government. The political realities are frequently such that without a minimum age requirement, the density or other concessions crucial to the economic feasibility of such projects would not be granted.
This bargaining is particularly apt to occur in communities that have little or no
high-density development and are fearful of the fiscal impact of this ratable were it
to increase the cost of municipal services by permitting residence by school-age children.
10. See text at notes 20-26 & 63-90 infra.
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East Cleveland, 11 where the Court found unconstitutional a zoning

ordinance that restricted the manner in which members of the same
family could live together. Although the zoning ordinance in Moore
did not impose age restrictions on occupancy, the decision articulates new limitations on state action that restricts the freedom of
members of the same family· to live with one another. Since many
retirement communities forbid otherwise eligible residents from living in the community with younger members of their families, the
decision in Moore suggests that the constitutionality of such age
segregation and the means employed to enforce it must be comprehensively examined. .
This Article offers a first contribution to that process of examination. Although age segregation in retirement communities
can be established in a variety of ways, the Article focuses primarily on age-restrictive zoning ordinances, the method most directly involving governmental action. The Article first considers
those persons adversely affected by age-restrictive retirement communities and suggests that potential plaintiffs may be divided into
three classes-neighboring property owners whose land values are
affected by the establishment of a retirement community, those
excluded from such a community solely by virtue of ·their age, and
those excluded or potentially excluded because of the age of persons
with whom they choose to live. Next, the constitutional arguments
available to each class of plaintiffs are explored. As a prcxluct
of that analysis, the Article contends that age-restrictive zoning
ordinances warrant strict judicial scrutiny, not because of their
economic impact or because they establish age segregation per se,
but rather because they intrude on the elderly individual's fundamental right to freedom of choice regarding family living arrangements. In line with that conclusion, the Article then suggests
that the justifications that a community might offer in support of
age-restrictive zoning do not withstand such scrutjny. Next, the
A1iticle considers possible arguments that the establishment of age
segregation in retirement communities by means of restrictive covenants involves state action and thus is subject to constitutional attack
under the fourteenth amendment. Concluding that these arguments
are highly unlikely to prevail, the Article suggests that the use of
restrictive covenants by retirement communities is immune from
constitutional attack.
11. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF AGE RESTRICTIONS
IN ZoNING ORDINANCES

Three different types of plaintiffs might challenge the constitutional validity12 of age restrictions in zoning ordinances. First, residents and taxpayers who own property near an area designated by
the ordinance as a retirement district might object ,to the zoning because their property values have been adversely affected. 13 The
second group of potential plaintiffs, who might be labeled "young
excludees," are those that the ordinance bars from residing in the
retirement district solely on the basis of their young age. Included
in this group are young singles, young couples, and those families
in which all the members are too young to be eligible for residence.
The third group, which might be called "age-heterogeneous families," share with the second the characteristic of being excluded
under the terms of the ordinance's age restriction. Although one
or more of such a family's members are old enough to qualify for
occupancy, the family as a whole is nevertheless excluded because
of the presence of a young child, or depending on the .terms of the
ordinance, because one spouse is too young to be eligible for occupancy. 14 Included in this group of excludees aie, for example, ,the
55-year-old man who is married to a younger wife and senior citizens
who- have assumed the care and custody of their grandchildren.
12. The validity of age-restrictive zoning depends not only upon constitutional
considerations but also upon the local government's authority under state zoning-enabling legislation. The cases in this area have dealt with both the statutory and constitutional questions. The statutory issues raised have included whether the challenged
zoning was adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, see, e.g., Taxpayers
Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 261-62, 364 A.2d 1016, 1022-23 (1976),
whether the enabling act permits the regulation of land users, as opposed to land
uses, see, e.g., 71 N.J. at 275-80, 364 A.2d at 1030-33, and whether the exclusion of
young people violates the statutory mandate to zone for the "general welfare," see,
e.g., 71 N.J. at 265-75, 364 A.2d at 1024-30, a claim that replicates the constitutional
due process claim. Since questions of statutory interpretation vary in their particulars
from state to state, they are only generally noted here.
13. See, e.g., Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 57•1, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909,
911 (1977); Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 486, 330 N.E.2d 403, 406, 369
N.Y.S.2d 385, 390, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
14. See, e.g., the ordinance at issue in Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm.
& Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976); Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth
Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311 A.2d 187 (Super, Ct. App. Div. 1973), revd.,
71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976). The Woodland Township ordinance restricted
residency "to persons who are 52 years of age or over except that one child who is
19 years of age or over may be permitted to reside." 71 N.J. at 234, 364 A.2d at
11008. Under this formulation, a 52-year-old with a younger spouse would be ineligible to live in the restricted district. The Weymouth ordinance similarly limited
residency to elderly persons (52 years of age or over) or elderly families (that could
include, however, a younger spouse 45 years of age or over, and all their children
over 18). 125 N.J. Super. at 379, 311 A.2d at 188.
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Although the cases in this area do not distinguish between
younger and older excludees, the distinction is offered here as a
means of comprehensively ordering and addressing the constitutional
issues raised by age-restrictive zoning ordinances. More particularly, the category of older excludees is formulated to emphasize that
age-restrictive zoning provisions can operate to exclude people not
only on the basis of their age but also because of their family arrangements. As will be shown later, this fact has constitutional significance.15
A.

Constitutional Claims of Neighbor-Taxpayers

The first reported opinion involving the validity of an agerestrictive zoning ordinance was a .1965 Connecticut case, Hinman
v. Planning and Zoning Commission. 10 In that case, the town had
amended its zoning ordinance to create a retirement community district where higher density residential development was permitted
and occupancy was restricted to persons aged over fifty, with exceptions for younger spouses and children over eighteen years old. The
court invalidated the ordinance on -the statutory ground that the
minimum age restriction went beyond the delegated zoning powers
of the town.17 In the next decade only a few cases, all from either
New Jersey or New York,- involved challenges to a local government's decision to grant permission-either by zoning or special
permit-for development of an age-restricted commu_nity. 18 With
one exception, these early cases, like Hinman, invalidated the agerestrictive zoning. 19
15. See text at notes 98 ..126 infra.
16. 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965).
17. The Hinman court suggested that the welfare of the developer who initiated
the zoning amendment, rather than the town's welfare, was the object of the amendment, since the town had no demonstrated need for a retirement community. 26
Conn. Supp. at 129, 214 A.2d at 133. For an account of how the Town of Southbury neatly avoided the court's decision in Hinman and arranged for construction of
the retirement community, see 2 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §
50.16, at 301 n.111 (1974).
18. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 128 N.J. Super. 379,
320 A.2d 191 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), affd. on other grounds, 135 N.J. Super.
97, 342 A.2d 853 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975 ), revd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005
(1976); Taxpayers Assn."v. Weymouth Township, 125 N.J. Super. 376, 311 A.2d 187
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973}, revd., 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976); Molino v.
Mayor & Council of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 2811 A.2d 401 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1971); Maldini v. Ambro, 43 App. Div. 2d ti64, 349 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1973),
affd., 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
993 (1975). Cf. Central Management Co. v. Town Bd., 47 Misc. 2d 385, 262
N.Y.S.2d 728 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (vacating town board decision finding location of proposed development unsuited for senior citizens).
19. The exception was Maldini v. Ambro, 43 App. Di'{. 2d 664, 349 N,Y.S.2d
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Beginning in 1975, however, the authority of these cases was
diminished by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
Maldini v. Ambro, 20 which sustained a retirement community zoning
orcl4iance. In 1976 the New Jersey Supreme Court followed, upholding zoning age restrictions by reversing the lower court decisions
in the companion cases of Taxpayers Association of Weymouth v.
Weymouth Township 21 and Shepard v. Woodland Township Committee and Planning Board. 22 Most recently, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed the trial court and ruled
in favor of an age-restrictive zoning ordinance in Campbell v.
Barraud. 28
Interestingly, none of the age-restrictive zoning cases has resulted from a direct confrontation between the local government and
those excluded from residency in the age-restricted zone. Rather,
in every case the zoning has been challenged by plaintiffs who were
neighboring property owners and taxpayers in the community, not
excludees. Their constitutional claim is that density concessions
granted in the retirement community zone will result in increased
traffic, congestion, and pollution and will lead to a decline in surrounding property values in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 24 The plaintiffs in these cases, however, have
not rested their challenge on this theory, apparently recognizing that
the courts in zoning cases have generally been unpersuaded by the
property-rights claims of neighbors. 25 In Maldini, for example, the
646 (1973), a/fd., 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), affirming the trial court's judgment sustaining the
ordinance.
20. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423
U.S. 993 (1975).
21. 71 NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
22. 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.2d 1005 (1976).
23. 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977).
24. See cases cited in note 13 supra. Aesthetic objections may also play a part
in motivating neighbors to sue, though this claim 4as nowhere been expressly stated,
probably,because zoning to exclude older persons on aesthetic grounds has been held
unreasonable and violative of the fourteenth amendment. In Women's Kansas City
St. Andrew Socy. v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932), the court stated:
Certainly the fact that aged people may have a depressing effect on some
people is not sufficient to exclude such people from a district. There is no limit
to the causes that may depress people, but they do not furnish a basis for the
support of a restriction as to use of one's property.
58 F.2d at 603. See also Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928).
25. Professor Norman Williams has explained this phenomenon in zoning law as
follows:
Most of the ,serious legal work on the American land use control system has
•.• operated on the assumption that the only important (or the really import•
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New Yark Court of Appeals quickly rejected the plaintiffs' property
claims on the ground that "a possible depreciation in value to particular property owners will not shield an existing zoning classification from adaption to changing community needs." 26
The exclusionary aspects of age-restrictive zoning ordinances are
more clearly vulnerable to constitutional attack, and consequently the
neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs have advanced constitutional claims not
so much on their own behalf as on behalf of those excluded by the
terms of the ordinance in question. These claims would likely not
be heard in federal court because of the Supreme Court's strict interpretation of standing requirements. 27 In state courts, however,
where all the age-restrictive zoning cases have been brought, the
standing rules are generally much less stringent, and thus in most
cases the neighbor-taxpayers have been able to assert the constitutional claims of excludees without challenge. 28 As a result, personal
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment-and not property claims-have formed the
ant) type of law suits in this field are those brought by developers to challenge
restrictions on their rights . . . . In neighbors' cases the legal technology is relatively primitive, with no clearly established nationwide rules on the appropriate
doctrine to deal with such suits. In the major zoning states, the courts have
shown a good deal of ingenuity in invoking various doctrines to give the neighbors at least some standing to raise issues in court . . . • However, the only
common denominator nationwide is that, except in a very few states, in fact the
neighbors usually lose.
1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 2.01, at 73-74.
26. 36 N.Y.2d at 486, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
21. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The following passage from the
Court's opinion imposing restrictive standing requirements on plaintiffs in exclusionary zoning suits seems relevant to the standing of neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs in agerestrictive zoning cases:
In several cases, this Court has allowed standing to litigate the rights of third
parties when enforcement of the challenged restriction against the litigant would
result indirectly in the violation of third parties' rights . . . . But the taxpayerpetitioners are not themselves subject to Penfield's zoning practices. Nor do
they allege that the challenged zoning ordinance and practices preclude or otherwise adversely affect a relationship existing between them and the persons whose
rights assertedly are violated . . . . Nor do the taxpayer-petitioners show that
their prosecution of the suit is necessary to insure protection of the rights asserted, as there is no indication that persons who in fact have been excluded
from Penfield are disabled from asserting their own right in a proper case. In
sum, we discern no justification for recognizing in the Rochester taxpayers a
right of action on the asserted claim.
422 U.S. at 510 (citations omitted). See also Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
28. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. at 235
n.1, 364 A.2d at 1008 n.1; Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. at 263
n.5, 364 A2d at 1023 n.5. In addition, consider Campbell v. Barraud, where the
court labeled neighbor-plaintiffs' standing to challenge the age _restrictions "highly
questionable," but decided to reach the merits of the issue because of the state's "liberal policy of standing in zoning cases." 58 App. Div. 2d at 571, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
911.
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basis for the constitutional challenge to residential age restrictions
in zoning.
Although standing in its technical sense has not been an issue
in the age-restrictive zoning cases, the absence of individual ex. cludees has in some instances presented a problem for the neighbortaxpayer plaintiffs. The neighbor-taxpayer plaintiffs object to
higher density development out of concern for property values or
aesthetics, 29 and thus the relief they seek is not a declaration of the
invalidity of the minimum-age provisions in the ordinance, but prohibition of the rezoning itself. These plaintiffs are in a poor position
to assert an exclusionary zoning claim, since the result they seekprecluding higher-density development in the challenged zone-is
itself exclusionary.
B.

Constitutional Claims of Young Excludees8°
1.

Equal Protection

To challenge the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance
successfully, plaintiffs must overcome the courts' traditional reluctance to become involved, without explicit constitutional justification, in complexities and choices that are basically legislative in
nature. Under the two-tiered system developed by the Supreme
Court for treating challenges to legislative classifications under the
equal protection clause, most cases are decided according to standards of reasonableness that are less than exacting. 81 First, the
29. That plaintiffs' exclusionary motive is likely to be recognized is illustrated by
an observation of the New Jersey Supreme Court in .Weymouth: "In the present case,
though, plaintiffs have not attacked the overall pattern of land use regulation adopted
by Weymouth Township as improperly exclusionary. . . . Indeed, the trial testimony
of several individual plaintiffs suggests that their true objection to the ordinances may
be that they are not sufficiently exclusionary." 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 104041 •.
30. To simplify the ensuing analysis, the claims of young excludees will be addressed as though the young persons were parties to the litigation and were asserting
constitutional claims on their own behalf and seeking a nonexclusionary result limited
to the removal of the age restriction from the ordinance.
31. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
Some commentators have observed that the courts in fact frequently abandon the
two-tiered standard in favor of an unarticulated sliding scale approach, where the
scope of judicial review is a function of the importance of the rights allegedly impaired. The .chief virtue of that standard is, of course, its comparative flexibility.
See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RBV.
1 (1972). For an example of such treatment in the area of sex-based classifications,
see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in which the Court struck down a legislative
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state's purpose in creating the challenged classification must be
legitimate. Then, the classification must be found to be reasonably related to that purpose, both in terms of the need for any classification
at all and in terms of the relationship of the particular classification
to the objective: "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. " 32 Classifications having a reasonable basis do not violate the fourteenth amendment for lack of "mathematical nicety" or because they result in
"some inequality." 33 Furthermore, -"if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain [the classification], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed." 34 Judged under this relaxed standard, most legislative
acts will readily withstand attack.
In certain circumstances, however, plaintiffs may be able to
trigger significantly more rigorous judicial review. Under the twotiered approach, that strict review will be applied when the court
finds that the classification is based upon a constitutionally "suspect"
class, or that the classification denies to a class the exercise of a
"fundamental right" protected by the Constitl,ltion, or that it denies
a benefit to members of a class on the basis of their exercise of a
fundamental right. 35 If plaintiffs are successful in demonstrating the
presence of a fundamental right or suspect class, the court will apply
"the most rigid scrutiny" to the legislation. 36 By way of justification,
the state must then. demonstrate not just that the legislation furthers
a legitimate state objective, but that it "promotes a compelling state
classification that preferred men over equally qualified women in the appointment
of administrators of decedents' estates. Sex has not been designated .a suspect classification, so that gender-based legislative categories are, in theory, not subjected to
strict scrutiny. But, though the Court purported to use the minimal rational basis
standard, the classification at issue in Reed did not survive constitutional challenge.
As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 106 (1972), it appears that the Court in Reed, although
not expressly deviating from the two-tiered analysis, in fact applied a test more
stringent than the reasonableness standard because the classification operated to the
detriment of women-a traditionally disadvantaged, but not "suspect," class. This
observation, however, does nothing to advance plaintiffs' cause in the age-restrictive
zoning cases, since the challenged ordinances operate to benefit, rather than penalize,
the members of a traditionally disadvantaged group.
32. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919).
33. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
34. 220 U.S. at 78.
35. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1972).
36. Korematsu v, United States, 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
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interest."37 Furthermore, under these circumstances, "the State
must demonstrate that its [classifying legislation] has been structured with 'precision,' and is 'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate
objectives and that it has selected the 'less drastic means' for effectuating its objectives."38 Subjected to this rigorous scrutiny, statutes
that impinge upon suspect classes or fundamental rights rarely
survive constitutional challenge.
From the point of view of the young excludee, the age-restrictive
zoning classifies persons on the basis of age and then denies to
young-agers the opportunity to reside in the retirement district set
aside for older persons. Under the two-tiered equal protection
analysis, then, the threshold issue is whether the age-based classification "operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges
upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the
Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny."39
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided that old age is not a suspect
classification meriting strict scrutiny. In Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia, 40 the Court upheld, against a challenge on
equal protection grounds, a Massachusetts statute imposing mandatory retirement on uniformed state police officers at age fifty. The
Court held that police officers over fifty were not a suspect class and
accordingly applied the rational basis standard. 41 The Court distinguished old age from "suspect" categories like race and nationality
as follows:
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who
have been discriminated against on the basis of race or national
origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 42
37. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 018, 638 (1968) (emphasis original).
38. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1972).
39. 411 U.S. at 17.
40. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
41. 427 U.S. at 312-13. The Court then validated the statute as not "wholly unrelated" to the legitimate state purpose of protecting the public by assuring the
physical preparedness of the uniformed police. 427 U.S. at 316.
42. 427 U.S. at 313. In this dissent, Justice Marshall called for a measure of
judicial scrutiny somewhere between strict scrutiny and the loose rational basis standard:
Of course, the Court is quite right in suggesting that distinctions exist between the elderly and traditional suspect classes such as Negroes, and between
the elderly and "quasi-suspect" classes such as women or illegitimates. . . . The
advantage of a flexible equal protection standard, however, is that it can readily
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Noting that the classification at issue discriminated against middleaged as well as elderly persons and that most members of the
political majority will eventually become elderly, the Court added
that "even old age does not define a 'discrete and insular' group . . .
in need of 'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.' " 43
Given the Court's conclusion that the elderly are not a suspect
class worthy of special protection, a fortiori, young-agers do not constitute such a class. Obviously, young-agers-under the terms of the
most typical ordinances, those under fifty-two or fifty-five years
old-are not historically disadvantaged, are not socially isolated, are
not without political power, and in most places are not a minority.
Thus, age-restrictive zoning cannot be said to disadvantage a class
of persons in need of special protection. To the contrary, it operates
to benefit a minority, the traditionally less powerful group of older
persons. For these reasons, a legislative classification that excludes
young-agers from a designated residential district cannot be said to
warrant strict judicial scrutiny on the ground that it works to the disadvantage of a suspect class. 44
accommodate such variables. The elderly are undoubtedly discriminated against,
and when legislation denies them an important benefit-employment-I conclude that to sustain the legislation appellants must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving that interest.

427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
43. 427 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938) ). In effect, this analysis is based in part on the determination of
whether age is a mutable or an immutable characteristic. In one sense, of course,
age is mutable, since everyone who enjoys a normal lifespan will experience old age.
But in other ways age is immutable. No one can, at any given moment, change his
age. And no one who is old can become young again. In upholding legislative classifications based on age, courts have chosen to overlook the immutable aspects of
aging in favor of the view that age is not an obstinate and unalterable characteristic
like race. In Maldini, the New York Court of Appeals was faced with a zoning age
restriction that allegedly discriminated against young people. Applying its view that
age is not a fixed characteristic, the court concluded that the ordinance actually had
no discriminatory effect:
"Senior citizenship" may oe more appropriately regarded as a stage in life
within the normal expectancy of most people than as an unalterable or obstinate
classification like race . • . religion or economic status. Therefore, providing
for land use suitable for the elderly may, as here, be viewed as a nondiscriminatory exercise of the power to provide for the general welfare of all people • • • •
36 N.Y.2d at 488, 330 N.E.2d at 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citations omitted).
Murgia involved the reverse situation-a statute that allegedly discriminated
against older persons. Clearly the Maldini reasoning could not justify the Massachusetts statute under review in Murgia since it would be impossible for those excluded
ever to enjoy the benefit accorded to the young by the act. But the Supreme Court's
conclusion that older persons are adequately represented in the political process and
do not warrant designation as a suspect class nevertheless indicates that the mutability concept served as the basis for the holding.
44. This reasoning was employed by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Taxpayers
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The next issue in determining the appropriate standard of
judicial review is whether the legislation impinges upon a "fundamental" right. The Court has designated as "fundamental" those
rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the various
first amendment freedoms, 45 and other rights necessarily implied by
constitutional provisions, such as the right to travel46 and the right
to vote. 47
In its 1972 decision in Lindsey v. Normet;18 the Court held that
access to housing is not a "fundamental" right, and thus it applied
the rational basis test in rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality
of Oregon's forcible entry and detainer statute. As the Court explained:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
-that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings
of a particular quality . . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the
assurance of adequate housing [is a] legislative, not judicial,
[function]. 49
In light of Lindsey, young excludees cannot assert, at least as a
matter of federal constitutional law, that by denying them access to
housing in a particular district the local government has abridged a
"fundamental" right. 150
Unlike access to housing, the right to travel, although nowhere
expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, has been declared by the
Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 281 n.15, 364 A.2d 1016, 1034 n.15
(1976).
45. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
46. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
47. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
48. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
49. 405 U.S. at 74. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in Murgia, the
Court "has apparently lost interest in recognizing further 'fundamental' rights and
'suspect' classes." 427 U.S. at 318-19. But cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977) (declaring the choice of family living arrangements to be a
fundamental right).
50. Although the issue is thus apparently resolved as a matter of federal constitutional law, the result could be different if decided by a state court according to state
constitutional principles. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1976). Justice Hall, in his widely
noted opinion, stated that access to shelter is literally essential to a decent life and
implied that housing will be treated as a "fundamental" right under state constitutional law. 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725. See also the differing approaches of
federal and state courts to the issue of the constitutionality of public school financing
in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 597, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1977); and Robinson
v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473,303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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Court to be a "fundamental" right. As developed in the case law,
the right seemingly came to include not only movement from state
to state but also the right to take up residence at the point of
destination. 51 The clearest assertion of that dimension of the constitutionally protected right to travel came in the celebrated Petaluma case. 52 There the federal district court found that local land
use regulations, aimed at controlling the rate and sequence of population growth in the city, infringed upon the freedom to travel of
prospective residents thereby excluded. The court consequently required the city to show that its annual numerical limit on building
permits and its greenbelt "urban expansion line" were justified by
a compelling state interest. Since the court found that the reasons
advanced by the city were not persuasive, much less compelling, 53
the "Petaluma Plan" was struck down.
Were the district court decision in Petaluma the last word on the
nature and scope of the "fundamental" right to travel, young excludees could assert a persuasive claim that age-restrictive zoning ordinances by virtue of their exclusiveness impinge upon the right to
travel and should therefore be subjected to strict scrutiny. The district
court's ruling in Petaluma, however, was reversed on other grounds
by the Ninth Circuit, 54 and its strength as a precedent is consequently
diminished. With respect to the right to travel issue, the Ninth
Circuit did not deal with the merits directly. Rather, it held that
the plaintiffs-landowners and builders in the city-lacked standing
to assert the claim on behalf of prospective residents and those excluded. 55 However, dictum in the opinion strongly suggests that the
Petaluma scheme did not violate the right to travel: "Although due
to appellees' lack of standing we do not reach today the right to
travel issue, we ~ate that the Petaluma Plan is not aimed at transients,
51. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972) (collecting cases). '11te Court
has refused to consider whether a constitutional distinction exists between interstate
and intrastate travel. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 25556 (1973).
52. Construction Indus. Assn. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal.
1974), revd. on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
934 (1976).
·
53. The city claimed that its water supply and sewage treatment facilities could
not accommodate a higher growth rate and, in addition, that its actions were justified
by a desire to protect its small-town character. The district court ruled that the
water supply, which had been artifically limited, and sewer system could be made
available to meet growth needs, 375 F. Supp. at 577, and that a desire to preserve
the town's character could not justify growth controls, 375 F. Supp. at 583.
54. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976).
55. 522 F.2d at 904.
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nor does it penalize those who have recently exercised their right
to travel . . . ." 56
The assertion that age-restrictive zoning impermissibly infringes
upon the excludees' right to travel is also undercut by the Supreme
Court's treatment of a related challenge in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas. 57 The Belle Terre ordinance prohibited residency by more
than two unrelated persons in any one housekeeping unit. Plaintiffs,
a property owner and several unrelated tenants, 68 challenged the ordinance on equal protection grounds, asserting inter alia that the ordinance impinged upon their fundamental right to travel and that
the 'compelling state interest standard should accordingly apply. Implicit in the argument was the premise that the fundamental right
to travel included the right to travel intrastate and to settle in residence at the point of destination. The plaintiff's claim, however,
was summarily rejected by the Court. 59 Justice Douglas' majority
opinion noted only that the ordin~ce "is not aimed at transients," 00
a statement echoed by the Ninth Circuit in Petaluma. Since earlier
cases that had indicated that the right to travel included not only the
right to move from place to place but also the right to take up residence were not overruled or even distinguished, the Court's treatment of ,thet i$ue is not particularly satisfying. Nevertheless, it
seems that after Belle Terre excludees will find it difficult to claim
that a zoning restriction impinges on a constitutionally protected right
to travel. 61
Finally, it is possible that the young-excludee plaintiffs can evoke
strict scrutiny by ~sserting that age-restrictive zoning infringes upon
a fundamental right of association. Essentially the same argument
was advanced by the unrelated tenants in Belle Terre and was, like
the right to travel claim, summarily rejected by the Court: "[The
56. 522 F.2d at 906 n.13.
57. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
58. Named tenant plaintiffs had left the house before the case reached the Supreme Court, causing Justice Brennan to dissent on the ground that no case or con•
troversy existed after their departure. 416 U.S. at 10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
majority, however, held that the plaintiff landlord's assertion that the rental value of
the property was affected by the ordinance was sufficient to state a justiciable claim,
416 U.S. at 9.
59. Belle Terre was decided before Petaluma, but was dismissed as "not relevant"
by the Petaluma trial court in a footnote. The court apparently sought to distinguish
Belle Terre by asserting that the right to travel was not involved in that case. 375
F. Supp: at 584 n.1.
60. 416 U.S. at 7.
61. Surely the fact that the young excludees may often seek to live in family
groups while those excluded in Belle Terre were unmarried should not affect the
travel issue.
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ordinance] involves no "fundamental" right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as . . . the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama
. . . or any rights of privacy, cf. Griswold v. Connecticut . . . ;
Eisenstadt v. Baird . . . ." 62 The cases cited by Justice Douglas suggest that the "fundamental" rights of association and privacy are
limited to political and family affiliations and decisions involving procreation. Clearly the young excludees, like the unrelated tenants
in Belle Terre, are not seeking to establish or participate in political
associations. Nor can they assert any rights concerning privacy and
association in the family. All members of the class of youngexcludee plaintiffs-whether single people, couples, or familiesare by definition below the minimum age for residency. Whatever
their family arrangements, they would still be barred by the
ordinance because of their age. Like the unsuccessful Belle Terre
plaintiffs, the young excludees are asserting an associational right of
a social rather than political nature that is unrelated to matters of
procreation or the family and therefore is unlikely to invoke strict
·scrutiny.
Since the young-excludee plaintiffs can neither establish themselves as a suspect class nor demonstrate that any fundamental right
is impaired by an age-restrictive zoning ordinance, a court would
be required to apply the rational basis standard of equal protection analysis to determine the measure's constitutionality as it" is
applied to them. This standard of reasonableness focuses on the
relationship between the government's chosen ends and means, asking first whether the locality's objective in creating the legislative
classification is legitimate and, secondly, whether the classification
is drawn in order to further that objective. Underlying that judicial
evaluation is a theoretical presumption of legislative validity. Both
the New York Court of Appeals in Maldini v. Ambro68 and the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the W eymouth 64 and Shepard 6"5 cases sustained age-restrictive zoning ordinances upon application of the
rational basis standard. 66 An examination of these cases strongly
62. 416 U.S. at 7-8 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall dissented in Belle Terre
on this point. In his view, the right to select one's living companions is a "personal
lifestyle choice" included in the rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the
first and fourteenth amendments. 416 U.S. at 15-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423
U.S. 993 (1975).
64. Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 NJ. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
65. Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 364 A.
2d 1005 (1976).
66. The courts' decisions were couched in terms of statutory, due process, and
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suggests that other plaintiffs who challenge such zoning will fail unless they are somehow able to invoke a more stringent standard of
judicial scrutiny. 67
Maldini arose in the Town of Huntington in Suffolk County, New
York. With no provision for multiple dwellings within its borders,
the town adopted an amendment to its zoning ordinance creating a
"Retirement Community District" classification. The amendment
allowed subsidized housing for the elderly, which was defined as follows: "Multiple residence designed to provide living and dining accommodations, including social, health care, or other supportive services and facilities for aged persons to be owned and operated by
a non-profit corporation organized for such purposes under the laws
of the State -0f New York." 88 Having created the new zone, the
Huntington Town Board approved •the application of a qualifjed
sponsor for reclassification of its twenty-acre parcel to permit construction of the type of facility described in the ordinance. Homeowners living near the site -then sought declaratory and injunctive
relief to bar the proposed development.
In Weymouth, the taxpayer plaintiffs challenged two ordinances.
The first, though on its face a regulation of mobile-home parks, in
fact operated as a zoning ordinance. It prohibited mobile-home
parks unless they were located upon tracts of at least 140 acres and
were recommended by the township planning board and approved
by the town's legislative body. Only three such parks were to be
licensed to operate at any one time. The second ordinance rezoned
a defendant's property as a "Trailer and Mobile Home District."
The plaintiffs, challenge focused on the residency restrictions contained in the first ordinance. One restriction required that at least
eighty per cent of the mobile homes in any park contain no more
than two bedrooms, clearly imposing a restriction, albeit indirect, on
occupancy by families with children. A second was more specific,
Hmiting occupancy to "elderly persons" or "elderly families," defined
equal protection questions. However, the analysis of each issue finally turned upon
the same questions: did the government's objective serve the general welfare so as
to bring it within the legitimate scope of the police power, and was the legislation
sufficiently related to the objective?
67. Although the court in Weymouth held that "neither 'fundamental' rights nor
'suspect' criteria for classification [were] implicated," 71 N.J. at 283, 364 A.2d at
1034, so that strict scrutiny was not required, it recognized that the "right to decent
housing" had preferred status under the New Jersey constitution requiring a "close
judicial scrutiny" when governmental action threatened to impinge upon it. 71 N.J.
at 287, 364 A.2d at 1037. Nevertheless, the court was "persuaded that the ordinances
in question . • . satisfy the requirements of equal protection even when subjected to
such scrutiny." 71 N.J. at 287, 364 A.2d at 1037.
68, 36 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388,
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to be persons aged fifty-two or older and families "the head of which,
or his spouse is 52 years of age or over." 69 The obvious effect of
the ordinance was to make mobile-home living in Weymouth available only to older people.
In contrast, the Woodland Township ordinance at issue in
Shepard contemplated high amenity "senior citizen communities,"
authorized as a special use in a iow-density residential-agricultural
district. Permitted uses in these. developments included singlefa!1lily detached and one-story attached dwellings, limited commercial facilities, and shopping centers. The ordinance required developers to provide a clubhouse and recreational building, shuffleboard
court, and swimming pool for residents and their guests. Detailed
design and green-space specifications were imposed. The age restrictions contained in the ordinance were as follows:
The permanent residents of a Senior Citizen Community shall be
confined to persons who are 52 years of age or over except that
one child who is 19 years of age or over may be permitted to
reside in any senior citizen dwelling unit occupied by his or her
parent(s) or guardian(s). Full time occupancy of any residential
unit shall be limited to 3 individuals. 70
As in Weymouth, plaintiff was a resident taxpayer of the town, not

an excludee.
In all three of the cases, the defendants asserted that the primary
purpose of the age limitations was to remedy an existing shortage
of housing for the elderly, a goal warmly endorsed by both the New
York and New Jersey courts. 71 In Weymouth, the defendant also
admitted to a fiscal motive-its officials testified at trial that they
had adopted the ordinance in part to obtain additional revenue for
the town and to avoid additional burdens on overcrowded schools. 72
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, was able to avoid the
fiscal zoning issue in Weymouth, 73 and, like the New York Court
69. 7'1 N.J. at 259, 364 A.2d at 1021.
70. 71 N.J. at 234, 364 A.2d at 1008. Neither the New Jersey Supreme Court
nor the courts below addressed the issue of how the restriction on number of residents promoted the welfare of elderly housing consumers.
71. In Maldini, the court of appeals described the provision of housing to the
aged as "a matter of general public concern not only to the localfty but to the State
and Nation as well." 36 N.Y.2d at 485, 330 N.E.2d at 406, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning Bd., 71 N.J. 230, 239-43,
364 A.2d ·1005, 1010-13 (1976); Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J ..
249, 266-74, 364 A.2d 1016, 1025-30 (1976). The appellate division in Campbell
refers to the goal as "this laudatory purpose." 58 App. Div. 2d at 572, 394 N.Y.S.
2d at 913.
.
72. 71 NJ. at 290, 364 A.2d at 1038-39.
73. The .Weymouth court noted its previous invalidation of ordipances restricting
new housing to categories of people who are net revenue producers or excluding
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of Appeals in Maldini, upheld the restriction as a reasonable means
of serving the housing needs of the elderly. 74
In upholding the legitimacy of each community's declared objective, each court was forced to address the question whether the
general welfare is served by legislation that responds to the needs
of one group within the population to the exclusion of other significant elements. 75 The Maldini court supported its conclusion by
families with children in order to reduce school expenditures, 71 N.J. at 289, 364
A.2d at 1038, but the court declined to apply the exclusionary test here on the ground
that plaintiffs had failed to challenge the township's "overall pattern of land use regulation." 71 N.J. at 294, 364 A.2d at 1040. The opinion admonished, however, that
"[t]he Court's failure to probe more deeply into the possible exclusionary effect of
similar ordinances should not be understood to be the product of blindness to their
potentially exclusionary character, but only the consequence of plaintiffs' decision not
to try the case on that legal theory." 71 N.J. at 295-96, 364 A.2d at 1041. The
Maldini court, citing the town's ''unimpeachable good faith," found no exclusionary
or fiscal motive in the enactment of that ordinance. 36 N.Y.2d at 487, 330 N.E.2d
at 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The implication is that the age restrictions would have
been invalid if justified solely on fiscal grounds.
7-4. 71 N.J. at 288, 364 A.2d at 1037. Several years after adoption of the Weymouth and Woodland Township ordinances, New Jersey revised its zoning enabling
legislation in an attempt to encourage and provide guidelines for senior citizen zoning
that would not run afoul of exclusionary zoning charges. Municipal Land Use Law,
1975 N.J. Laws, ch. 291 (codified at NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to :55D-92 (West
Supp. 1977)). Section 65(g) allows the local government to zone for such development only if the zoning is "consistent with provisions permitting other residential uses
of a similar density in the same zoning district." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D2(1) (West Supp. 1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Weymouth expressed
its disapproval of this provision, finding it inadequate protection against the exclusionary threat of senior citizen housing and worrying that the "similar density" guide•
lines might impede rather than encourage the development of such housing. 71 N .J.
at 292-93, 364 A.2d at 1039-40. Instead, the court endorsed the proposal of the New
Jersey Public Advocate that "zoning for planned housing developments for the elderly
be permitted only as part of a comprehensive municipal plan for a balanced housing
stock." 71 N.J. at 293, 364 A.2d at 1040.
75. On a larger scale, the preliminary inquiry might be into the effect of age•
restricted living on society as a whole. There are few answers to be found in the
social science literature on this question, although much of the scholarly work on
the subject of residential age segregation endorses the social utility of the concept.
It is fair to say that the current majority view among gerontologists and sociologist~
deems the exclusion of younger age groups from retirement communities to be so•
cially acceptable. See, e.g., I. Rosow, Soc:IAL INTEGRATION OF THE AGED (1967);
Bultena & Wood, The American Retirement Community: Bane or Blessing?, 24 J.
GERONTOLOGY 209 (1969); Rose, The Subculture of the Aging: A Topic for Sociological Research, 2 THE GERONTOLOGIST 123 (1962). But see D. JONAS & D. JoNAS,
YOUNG nLL WE Drn (1973), in which it is concluded that the planned retirement
communities, with their lack of intergenerational contacts and overwhelming emphasis
on leisure, tum many older people into "dependent, protected, or playful 'superchildren', [with] the retirement communities .•. becoming what might be called the
nurseries of second childhood." Id. at 154-55.
Unfortunately, the experts' endorsement of age segregation is often made only indirectly or implicitly, in connection with the study of a particular retirement community or some single aspect of life therein. Those few studies that have addressed
the relationship of age-homogeneous living to society often take the form of disproving certain negative hypotheses about the impact of a retirement development on
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characterizing age as "a stage in life." 76 Since the general populace
theoretically will aehieve old age, the provision of housing for senior
citizens can be said to serve the welfare of the vast majority who
will be old. 77 The New Jersey court in Weymouth took a somewhat
the local community that houses it. See, e.g., K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 65-144,
in which the author seeks to disprove the hypothesis that retirement developments
have an adverse fiscal and political impact on their host communities.
Left unaddressed are the more profound questions raised by residential age segregation, such as what it portends for the future relationship of the generations. Widespread age districting raises the possibility that large numbers of children will grow
to adulthood without the opportunity for daily contact with older people. Adverse
consequences of this kind of isolation include the polarization of the generationsolder people would develop a group identity by casting out youth and refusing further
involvement with the general culture, and younger people, denied the ability to pre•
pare for their own aging by witnessing the process in others, would face growing
old with bewil~erment and even fear. Finally, a strong argument can be made that,
in a pluralistic society, segregation-particularly the exclusion or inclusion of people
based on their physical characteristics-should not be encouraged. Although it is
otherwise distinguishable from racial segregation, age districting does share the element of categorizing as undesirable those persons who share only a physical characteristic. To this .extent, age segregation, like racial segregation, is offensive because
it ignores the individuality of those classified as desirable or undesirable.
76. 36 N.Y.2d at 488, 330 N.E.2d at 408, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
77. Aside from providing adequate shelter for the aged that meets their particular
economic and physical needs, senior citizen housing can also be said to serve the
"special social and psychological needs of the elderly." Taxpayers Assn. v. Weymouth Township, 71 N.J. 249, 269, 364 A.2d 1016, 1027 (1976). Hard as it may
be for the uninitiated to imagine, sociologists have developed a means of measuring
morale or happiness in human beings, called the "life satisfaction scale." See Neugarten, Havighurst & Tobin, The Measurement of Life Satisfaction, 115 J. GERONTOLOGY 134 (1961). A comparative survey of the life satisfaction levels of retired
persons in regular and age-segregated communities in Arizona found 75% of the retirement community residents surveyed to be satisfied with retirement life, compared
with only 57 % of those who resided in normal communities. The median level of
satisfaction in the retirement community population ranked in the "high" category,
whereas median satisfaction of retirees in outside communities was classified as
"medium." Bultena & Wood, supra note 75, at 211. But see I. JACOBS, FuN CITY
(1974), a study of one large retirement community that found many of the residents
to be lonely and unable to deal with their isolation. The study concluded that, "while
most residents felt that they had achieved the peace and quiet they had sought, it
was at a price [i.e., being cut off from society as a whole] that was higher than some
had intended to pay." Id. at 82.
Scholarly studies and less formal surveys of retirement community dwellers predictably expound a widely shared view that the absence of children and younger
adults is an important positive aspect of the age-homogenous environment. Besides
ensuring some measure of quiet and order, see H. WHITMAN, A BRIGHTER LATER
LIFB 169 (1971), age segregation has been claimed to reduce stress by insulating residents from the loss of status generally suffered by retired persons in American society.
They [the residents] felt a great community bond in the fact that all of them
were on an equal plane, as it were. They were not in competition with younger
people, nor were they relegated to the back seat automatically reserved for the
aged. They were the active movers and doers of the community, not the 'hasbeens' • • . • Moreover they were not oppressed • • . by the fad of youth worship:
Id. at 1158-59. See Rose, supra note 75, at 123.
In addition, the "social opportunity" available to retirement community residents

84

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 76:64

different approach to the issue. Rather than suggesting that agerestrictive zoning ordinances serve the general welfare78 because the
is frequently cited by them and others as another important source of satisfaction.
Sociologists have tested and confirmed the seemingly paradoxical hypothesis that the
more age segregated an area, the more socially integrated are its residents-that is,
the more formal and informal social contact between neighbors and more friendships
among them. See I. Rosow, supra note 75. The particular affinity of the elderly
for each other derives largely from shared experience. The "empty nest" syndromethe sense of loss experienced as the children leave home or for other reasons the
family begins to diminish-makes more acute the desire and willingness for friendship
and provides a common ground of understanding. Common physical limitations,
or tl).e increased possibility of their onset, and a shared generational vantage point on
a rapidly changing society also contribute to a sense of community among older
persons. See Rose, supra note 75, at 123.
This thesis does not consider the pre-retirement social lives of the populations surveyed, however. It is possible that planned retirement communities are most attractive to those accustomed to an extensive social life. To the extent that the social
integration of retirement community residents is related to their previous level of so•
cial activity, age segregation loses some of its importance in explaining their involvement with each other.
It may be, however, that the high economic and social status of the residents of
a high-priced retirement community favorably affects the level of contentment among
the community's residents. Studies have indicated that the widely shared personal attributes and felicitous circumstances of residents are just as important to their psychological welfare as are the exclusion of children and young adults. Although no
definitive nationwide statistics exist, studies of particular developments show that,
except for the low-income elderly who reside in government-subsidized developments,
residents of retirement communities are an elite socioeconomic group among retirees.
A study of Arizona retirement community dwellers, for example, showed that 52%
had formerly held professional or management positions and that 43 % had one or
more years of college. They also appeared to enjoy better health than did retirees
living in other settings: 75% of those polled in the retirement communities saw their
health as good or very good, as compared with 59% of the retirees residing outside.
Bultena & Wood, supra note 75, at 212. Similarly, a study of the residents of five
representative retirement communities in New Jersey found that 43 % of the retirement community dwellers had attended college, as compared with 11 % of the elderly
nationwide; more than two-thirds of the communities' residents had been professional
workers, which is twice the proportion of professionals in New Jersey's entire work
force; and at least three-quarters of the surveyed population exceeded the national
median income for persons aged 65 and over. In terms of racial makeup, these communities were overwhelmingly white. See K. HEINTZ, supra note 1, at 32-38. The
New Jersey study concluded that
(a]lthough the retirement development group is not generally of the upperincome class, it is, nonetheless, a select status group, when educational and occupational characteristics are examined in combination with income statistics.
The New Jersey retirement community population is comparable in socioeconomic characteristics to the other national retirement community residents,
but is obviously distinct from the elderly population at large on the basis of race,
of household composition, and more importantly, of social status indicators such
as education, occupation, and income.
Id. at 37.
To the extent that these characteristics would be shared by the residents of a proposed age-restricted community, the question whether the general welfare is served
· by a zoning ordinance directed at but one insular minority within the elderly minority
of the population at large becomes more troublesome.
78. In the New Jersey cases, the issue arose in the context of the question
whether the towns' statutorily delegated power to zone to "promote • • • the general
welfare" included the power to zone for senior citizen developments. Even though
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bulk of the population will at some point be~ome eligible for the
benefits afforded the elderly, the court argued that the general welfare concept is "expansive" and "capacious," contemplating "the provision of housing for all categories of people, including the elderly."70 Moreover, the court found it particularly noteworthy that
'the special housing and social needs of elderly persons-whose
numbers are increasing rapidly both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the population-would be served especially well by agehomogeneous retirement communities. so
In order to uphold the ordinances challenged in Maldini,
Weymouth, and Shepard, the rational basis standard requires a finding that the age-based classifications are reasonably related to the expressed goal of providing appropriate housing for the aged. Of the
three ordinances, the one at issue in Maldini seems most consistent
with that goal. The retirement community anticipated by the
Maldini ordinance was to be publicly subsidized, and units were to
be available to consumers at low cost. Support services were to be
provided for those with· limited ability to care for themselves. In
addition, the ordinance set no precise age limit for exclusion, but
rather referred to "residences designed . . . for aged persons."81
the issue was statutory, the considerations brought to bear were the same as those
in due process and equal protection analysis.
79. 71 N.J. at 275, 364 A.2d at 1030 (emphasis original).
80. 71 N.J. at 266-75, 364 A.2d at 1025-30.
The court also noted the federal government's actions in recognition of the fact
that older people face special problems in locating suitable housing because of low
fixed incomes, difficulties in obtaining mortgage financing, and the need for housing
specially planned for safety and convenience. See Senior Citizens Housing Act of
1962, 12 U.S.C. § 170lr (1970).
Congress has enacted several measures to address these problems, the most important of which are authorization of direct loans for the development of rental housing for low income elderly persons, see 12 U.S.C. § 170lq(a)(2) (1970); and rent
subsidies for tenants in such housing, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(g) (Supp. V 1975). See
generally Melm!Ul,. Housing for the Aged-the Government Response: An Analysis
of the Missouri Boarding House for the Aged Law, 8 URB. LAW. 123, 125-30 (1976).
It is important to note that Congress' purpose in creating these programs was not
to establish age-segregated communities, but rather to increase the supply of housing
available to low and moderate income elderly persons. But cf. Riley v. Stoves, 22
Ariz. App. 223, 229, 526 P.2d 747, 753 (1974), where the Arizona Court of Appeals
incorrectly states that "Congress has recognized the need of elderly Americans for
adult communities." Contrary to the Arizona court's statement and the implication
contained in the New Jersey cases, Congress has nowhere found or declared that federal funds should be spent to provide elderly persons with a child-free environment.
Similarly, the expressed purpose of the New Jersey Senior Citizens Housing Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. 55:141-1 to -9 (West Supp. 1977), which was cited in Weymouth, is
to facilitate development of federally funded housing projects for lower-income
elderly persons, and not to establish age-homogeneous communities. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. 55:141-2 (West Supp. 1977).
81. 36 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 330 N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388.
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Presumably the development's nonprofit sponsor could admit residents solely on the basis of their need for the facilities provided in
the community, without regard to rigid age limitations. 82
The ordinance in Weymouth, however, seems less suited to that
town's avowed goal. Although there is no question that mobile
homes, the subject of the township's ordinances, are well suited to
the needs of the elderly consumer for moderate-cost housing of
manageable size, it is less clear whether the residency limitation to
persons aged fifty-two and over is reasonably related to the goal of
meeting the particularized housing needs of the elderly. Certainly
a great many persons over fifty-two do not possess physical and sociological characteristics that suggest housing needs distinct from
those in -the mainstream of the population. 83 Indeed, the court itself
seemed implicitly to acknowledge that fact, for in asserting the need
for housing designed specifically for the elderly, the court relied on
data concerned exclusively with persons sixty-five and over. 84 However, by placing heavy reliance on the presumption of legislative
validity, the court sustained the classification as not unreasonable. 86
The New Jersey Court granted similar leeway to the ordinance
challenged in Shepard, though that ordinance was perhaps even less
adapted to the generally recognized housing needs of the elderly.
Besides setting the minimum age for occupancy at fifty-two, a
relatively young age, the disputed measure contemplated construction
of high amenity and therefore relatively high-cost housing. Though
such housing would be functionally well suited to the elderly, its high
82. In Campbell v. Barraud, 58 App. Div. 2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1977),
the New York court upheld an ordinance ~that established the age for residential eligibility at 55, with exceptions for underage spouses and caretakers and for children and
grandchildren over the age of 19. It is unclear whether the planned development
was to be low or moderately priced.
83. In fact, the age limitation as formulated could operate counter-productively,
in that it would permit middle-aged purchasers to compete with the elderly in securing access to a limited supply of suitable housing.
84. See 71 N.J. at 266-69, 364 A.2d at 1025-27. To conclude, however, that the
minimum age of 52 is too low in light of the purpose of the ordinance is ultimately
to conclude that the ordinance,, in order to pass the test of reasonableness, must be
more restrictive, not less. That is, age-restrictive zoning is most closely related to
its purpose when it is most exclusionary. This observation again calls into question
·whether residential age restrictions can be said to serve the general welfare. See
notes 75-80 supra and accompanying text.
85. 71 N.J. at 284-85, 364 A.2d at 1035. The court noted several justifications
for concluding that the age 52 cutoff was not unreasonable or without factual basis,
including a decline in net income for many persons reaching this age and the general
lowering of the age of retirement in this country. A less persuasive reason also given
was that the median age at which men and women become grandparents is now 57
and 54, respectively. 71 N.J. at 284, 364 A.2d at 1035.
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price does not respond to the needs of those most seriously affected
by the housing shortage-elderly persons with low incomes and
limited savings. The court, however, was able to find that the
ordinance was sufficiently responsible to the needs of the elderly
population in general, partly because it believed the ordinance
would operate indirectly to provide the elderly with more low-cost
housing opportunities. 86 In this connection, the court noted that the
increased densities permitted by the ordinance would result in housing that was less expensive than dwellings with comparable amenities in other parts of the town. 87 Additionally, the court predicted
that a "filtration effect" would occur in the area housing market:
[C]onstruction of senior citizen communities will indirectly increase the supply of housing for all income groups as more elderly
citizens gravitate towards retirement communities. For example,
as middle and upper income persons leave their former homes for
retirement communities, more housing will become available for
elderly persons with lower incomes . . . .88
In sum, the court "was satisfied that the Woodland Township ordinance serve[d] the peculiar housing needs of the elderly,"89 and,
indeed, that it was "in many respects, even more responsive to the
special housing needs of the elderly than the zoning ordinances which
we upheld in Weymouth Tp." 90

2.

Due Process

As with equal protection claims, a challenge on substantive due
process grounds calls for a choice between individual rights and
legislative assertions of the public interest. Due process claims most
86. 71 N.J. at 242-43, 364 A.2d at 1012.
87. 71 N.J. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012.
88. 71 N.J. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012. The best that can be said for this asser•
tion is that the cause and effect relationship posited is extremely indirect and could
be achieved only over a long period of time. Moreover, it is interesting to note that
Justice Pashman, author of the Shepard opinion, himself refuted the ''filtration effect"
agrument in his earlier concurring opinion in Southern Burlington County NAACP
v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 15•1, 205, 336 A.2d 713, 741, appeal dismissed,
423 U.S. 803 (1975):
In theory, low and moderate income families should benefit even from construction of new housing which they themselves cannot afford because such housing
creates vacancies which "filter down." In reality, however, most of these
vacancies are absorbed by the enormous lag between population growth and new
housing construction. . . . The housing which does ''filter down" to persons
with low or moderate incomes is o{ten badly dilapidated and in deteriorating
neighborhoods.
89. 71 NJ. at 243, 364 A.2d at 1012-13.
90. n N.J. at 240, 364 A.2d at 1011.
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often invoke the rational basis test of whether the measure is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The legislation is treated with deference and usually survives the limited judicial
review. 91 However, as in equal protection analysis, if the challenged
measure impinges on certain "fundamental" personal liberties, "the
usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate," 92 and
the court
accordingly apply more careful and searching review.
To justify the legislation under this more rigid standard, the state
must show that the enactment is closely related to the achievement
of important governmental interests. 93 This more rigorous scrutiny,
of course, correspondingly diminishes the chances that the legislation
will survive constitutional challenge.
After Belle Terre, 94 young excludees cannot claim infringement
upon fundamental personal rights of travel, privacy, or association
solely by virtue of their exclusion from a residential area. For
essentially the same reasons that an equal protection claim would
be unsuccessful, it is •unlikely that due process arguments would
overturn age-restrictive zoning ordinances. Left to judge the state's
ends and means by the standard of reasonableness, the courts are
likely to sustain these ordinances under the due process clause, as
the highest courts of New York and New Jersey already have, on
the ground that these measures reasonably serve the state's legitimate interest in providing for the housing needs of the elderly.
·one group of young excludees, however, has a somewhat different claim to assert under substantive due process. Since agerestrictive zoning ordinances are commonly phrased in terms of
occupancy and not ownership, young persons, though barred from
residence, remain free to own property in a restricted zone. Thus,
the situation might arise where a young person acquires property
in a retirement community, perhaps by gift or devise, but is barred
by law from residing there. For these excludees, the ban on occupancy denies user rights traditionally associated with property o~nership and thus arguably violates the fourteenth amendent's guaran-

will

91. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), the Supreme
Court for the first time upheld the constitutionality of zoning. In the course of its
analysis of the due process issue, the Court stated: "If the validity of the legislative
classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control." 272 U.S. at 388.
92. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977).
93. 431 U.S. at 499.
94. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), discussed in text at notes
51-62 supra.
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tee against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Though this claim has yet to be litigated and thus is difficult to
assess with any degree of certainty, it can be argued that the ordinance has deprived the young owner of all personal uses of his property, which might be considered a "taking" in violation of the due
process clause. 95 On the other hand, it is clear that the ordinance
is not totally confiscatory, since the property can still be rented or
sold to persons eligible for occupancy and thus retains at least most
of its economic value. Furthermore, courts have sustained the
constitutionality of public land restrictions that bar owners from
occupying their own property. 96 Finally, communities that enact
age-restrictive zoning ordinances can cite the New York and New
Jersey cases as support for the claim that such zoning serves a
legitimate purpose of the general welfare that justifies the interference with a landowner's normal prerogatives. 97
C.

Constitutional Claims of Older Excludees

Age-restrictive zoning ordinances, regardless of their exact formulation, uniformly prohibit residency by school-age children. The
most exclusive ordinances bar occupancy by all persons under
the specified minimum age, which of course excludes -young spouses
as well as children. Other less exclusive measures allow spouses
below the minimum age and one or more children above high-school
95. "The general rule . . . is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
For cases in which zoning restrictions were overturned on due process grounds,
see Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Arvene Bay Constr. Co.
v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
96. See, e.g., Lamb v. City of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959);
Roney v. Board of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956) (upholding noncumulative zoning ordinances excluding residences from industrial districts).
91. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (sustaining zoning ordinance against attack on due process grounds, the Court having
found the legislative purpose to be sufficiently related to the public health, safety,
and welfare).
Older owners might advance a similar claim based on fourteenth amendment
property rights. Although eligible to reside in the retirement community, their control over the alienation of their property is impaired by the zoning ordinance that
establishes a minimum age for occupancy since conveyance to younger persons or,
in some instances, to older excludees is effectively precluded when the conveyee is
not free to reside on the property. This claim carries considerably less force than
does the claim of the excluded owners, however. Unlike excludees who have acquired property in the retirement community, the older owner is eligible to occupy
his property. Moreover, property values are unlikely to be significantly affected, and
may even be enhanced, by the indirect restraint on alienation so long as demand for
retirement living remains high among middle-aged persons.
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age (usually those aged nineteen or over). These ordinances thus
operate to exclude older p~rsons as well as younger persons, in that
residents or potential residents who meet the minimum age requirements may nonetheless be excluded if they live with school-age children or, depending upon the ordinance, with a young spouse.
The Supreme Court has designated as "fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race" the right of privacy and choice
in regard to marital and family matters. 98 An important early explication of this "fundamental" right is found in Meyer v. Nebraska, 00
where the Court overturned a state statute that forbade the teaching
of any language other than English to school children prior to the
ninth grade. Thei decision was based in part upon the parents'
right under the "liberty" clause of the fourteenth amendment to
control the education of their children. In attempting to delineate
this right, the Court stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness
-the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home
and bring up children . . . .10 0
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 101 the Court used
a similar rationale to overturn a state statute that required all children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public school.
Citing Meyer, the Court found that the act "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control."102 In a later case,
Prince v. Massachusetts, 103 the Court described Pierce and Meyer
as decisions that "respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter." 104
The Supreme Court has also recognized a fundamental right to
freedom from governmental interference in matters involving pro98. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316-U.S. 535,541 (1942).
99. 262 U.S. 390 (1922).
.
100. 262 U.S. at 399. .
101. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
102. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
103. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
104. 321 U.S. at 166. In Prince the Court did permit the state to enter some
aspects of family life, however, by upholding-the application of the state's child labor
laws to religious leafletting by a nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness acting at the direction of her aunt and guardian.
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creation. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 105 the first case in this area, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to invalidate on equal protection
grounds a state statute authorizing sterilization of certain recidivist
felons. Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 106 the Court invalidated
on due process grounds a state statute forbidding the use of contraceptive devices. Justice Douglas' opinion found the stafute violative
of the right to privacy in marriage that, although nowhere specifically
mentioned in the Constitution, lies "within the zone of privacy created
by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."107 Eisenstadt
v. Baird108 further defined -the right of privacy and choice in matters
of procreation by overturning a state statute that forbade the sale and
advertisement of contraceptives to unmarried people. Similarly, in
Roe v. Wade, 109 the Court relied ·on "[t]his right of privacy, whether
founded in ,the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty
and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or . . . in the
Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people,"110 in striking
down on due process grounds Texas' anti-abortion statute. Finally,
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 111 the right of family
privacy was found to clash with a state statute mandating retirement
of female workers in the fifth month of pregnancy. Overturning
the measure on due process and equal protection grounds, the Court
stated that it had "long recognized that freedom of personal choice
105. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
106. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
107. 381 U.S. at 485. More particularly, Justice Douglas found that the right
to privacy resides within the "penumbra" of specific Bill of Rights' guarantees applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
including the first, third, fourth, and fifth amendments. 318 U.S. at 482-85. In a
now-famous concurring opinion, J_ustice Goldberg advanced the view that the "liberty" clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which through the ninth
amendment are not restricted to rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments, are the sources of the right to marital privacy. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In describing the character of the right protected, Justice Goldberg declared that "[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected." 381 U:S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, also concurring in the Court's judgment, declared that "[t]he Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom." In his view, the Connecticut statute infringed upon due process "because [it]
violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" 381 U.S. at 500.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White
also based his concurrence in Griswold solely on the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 381 U.S. at 502.
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. 410 U.S. at 153.
111. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 112
Besides child-rearing and procreation, the Court has recognized
that the right of family privacy and choice extends to the selection
of a spouse. Loving v. Virginia, 113 in which the Court in part used
due process to invalidate Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, contains a clear statement of the right:
These statutes also deprive the [plaintiffs] of liberty without
due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.
Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental
to our very existence and survival.114
In a recent case, the Supreme Court held that the right to privacy
and choice in family matters extends beyond parent-child and husband-wife relationships to encompass the "extended family" as well.
Also, and perhaps more important for present purposes, the Court
offered the first clear statement that certain zoning ordinances may
by virtue of their exclusivity impinge on protected family rights
and thus be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Moore v. City of East
Cleveland1 15 concerned a housing ordinance limiting occupancy
in the city to members of a single family. The ordinance's complicated definition of "family" excluded the combination of relatives
living in Mrs. Moore's home, which consisted of Mrs. Moore, one or
two of her sons, and two grandsons who were related to each other
as first cousins, not as brothers. 116 Mrs. Moore was convicted of
violating the ordinance. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Powell,117 reversed the conviction on the ground that the ordinance
112. 414 U.S. at 639-40. But cf. 414 U.S. at 651, 652 (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that these freedoms are not absolute).
113. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
114. 388 U.S. at 12 (citing Skinnerv. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ).
115. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
116. 431 U.S. at 496. As Justice Stevens notes in his concurring opinion in
Moore, much of the litigation concerning single-family ordinances has addressed the
question whether unrelated persons can be barred from residency. 431 U.S. at 51519. The East Cleveland housing code was more restrictive than the usual singlefamily ordinance, in that occupancy was limited to certain combinations of relatives,
thus barring some related persons.
117. The 5-4 decision inspired a total of six separate opinions: the majority opinion of Justice Powell (joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall), concurring opinions by Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall),
and dissenting opinions by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart (joined by Justice
Rehnquist), and Justice White.
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worked a denial of "liberty" and thus violated the due process clauseof the fourteenth amendment.
Citing Meyer, Pierce, Griswold, and LaFleur, the Court pointed
to the factor that distinguished the East Cleveland ordinance from
the zoning ordinance upheld in Belle Terre:
Sut one overriding factor sets this case apart from Belle Terre.
The ordinance there affected only unrelated individuals. It expressly
allowed all who were related by "blood, adoption, or marriage" to
live together, and in sustaining the ordinance we were careful to
note that it promoted "family needs" and "family values." ...
East Cleveland, in contrast, has chosen to regulate the occupancy of
its housing by slicing deeply into the family itself. . . .
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family,
neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; the usual judicial deference
to the legislature is inappropriate.118
Adopting Justice Harlan's view of the concept of "liberty" as a
dynamic "rational continuum" based on history and tradition, 119 the
majority extended the family privacy cases, which were mainly
concerned with couples and their dependent children, to find constitutionally protected rights for extended families as weU. 120 Since
the East Cleveland ordinance impinged on Mrs. Moore's "fundamental" right to live with other members of her family,1 21 the Court
resolved to "examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation. " 122
To justify its restrictive definition of "family," the City of East
Cleveland claimed an interest in limiting the burdens on its school
118. 431 U.S. ;it 498-99 (emphasis original). By "Euclid," the Court was referring to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), discussed in
note 91 supra.
119. 431 U.S. at 501-02 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
120. "Ours is by no means a tradition limit~d to respect for the bonds uniting
the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition." 431 U.S. at
504.
121. Dissenting Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, objected both to the
Court's recognition of this "new" constitutional right and, more generally, to the
Court's failure to exercise proper restraint on this substantive due process issue. 431
U.S. at 531-41 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice White, also dissenting, asserted that
"the interest in residing with more than one set of grandchildren is [not] one that
calls for any kind of heightened protection under the Due Process Clause." 431 U.S.
at 549 (White, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger's dissent was based upon Mrs.
Moore's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 431 U.S. at 521 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
122. 431 U.S. at 499.
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system and preventing overcrowding and traffic congestion. The
Court, however, although acknowledging the legitimacy of those
goals, concluded that the East Cleveland ordinance "serve[d] them
marginally, at best."123 In this regard, the Court noted that the
ordinance was both underinclusive-for example, a dozen schoolage children could live in a single-family dwelling with their parents
or with their parent and grandparent without violating the ordinance
-and overinclusive-for example, the ordinance would bar occupancy by an adult brother and sister who neither owned a car nor
imposed upon the school system. In sum, the Court found the
ordinance to have only "a tenuous relation" to the goals espoused,
and thus it did not withstand the Court's scrutiny under the due
process clause. 124
The long line of cases vindicating a "fundamental" right to privacy and personal choice in certain matters involving marriage and
the family has relevance to the claims of older persons who are
excluded from residential areas by age-restrictive zoning ordinances
on the basis of their family living arrangements. First, all such
zoning restrictions limit the freedom to decide whether to bear
children, a right recognized in Skinner, Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe. Under any formulation, these ordinances penalize older persons who decide to have and live with children either by denying
such adults the eligibility to reside in the designated zone or by
requiring them to move away from their homes should they be
residing in the restricted community at the time a child is born.
Second, the most restrictive formulation of age-restrictive zoning
ordinances affects older persons in the choice of a spouse, a right
defined and protected in Loving. Under these enactments an older
person marrying a spouse below the minimum age for occupancy
is for all practical purposes denied access to or forced to leave the
community. Similarly, an older person might lose residential eligibility by marrying a spouse with young dependent children, even
though rthe spouse might qualify by age. Finally, the older person's right to live with his children and grandchildren in an extended family group, which is recognized as "fundamental" in
123. 431 U.S. at 500.
124. 431 U.S. at 500. The Court's analysis and conclusions are reminiscent of
those propounded by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), discussed in text at notes 57-62 supra. Justice
Marshall found the Belle Terre ordinance to be similarly under- and over-inclusive
and thus insufficiently related to its declared purposes of preventing congestion and
overcrowding. 416 U.S. at 18-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Moore, is also limited by age-restrictive zoning. That limitation
has perhaps the most widespread impact, since older persons, like
Mrs. Moore, often assume the care and custody of school-age grandchildren. Again, the penalty for unde_rtaking a family living arrangement similar to that of Mrs. Moore is denial· of access to or expulsion
from the retirement zone. 125
The question that Moore and the other family privacy cases leave
unanswered is whether a community might be able to present sufficient justification for the adoption of age-restrictive zoning provisions.
Since the older-excludee plaintiffs can assert "fundamental" rights
of family privacy, the courts will impose on the defendant community a substantial burden of justification. To withstand the plaintiff's challenge on due process or equal protection grounds, the
community must demonstrate that "important" or "compelling" interests are in fact served by the ordinance. As the ~ity of East
CleV'eland_didJn.Jhe lY./.oQ,:!!_ c.ase, the community niight defend its
adoption of the age-restrictive zoning as necessary to prevent overcrowding in certain school districts and the resultant increased burden on taxpayers. In Moore, the Supreme Court found that goal to
be "legitimate," although the East Cleveland ordinance was held to
be insufficiently related to the purpose. 126
In challenging those provisions in age-restrictive ordinances that
prohibit older persons with young spouses, the excludees can make
a forceful argument that the means employed are not adequately
related to the ends desired. The exclusion of young spouses does
nothing to diminish demand on the public schools. As for the
provisions excluding children, the town can argue that at least in
regard to the school district in which the retirement community is
located, the exclusion relates directly to the goal of preventing
financial burdens on the public schools. In this respect, the plain125. In Moore, to be sure, the entire City of East Cleveland was subjected to
the family restriction, leaving Mrs. Moore and her grandchildren no housing alternative within the city. Assuming, instead, that only one residential district in town is
designated as age-restricted, it might be argued that, since comparable housing alternatives exist within the town, those excluded or expelled have not suffered a legally
cognizable harm. Cf. 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) (extending this argument to the availability of comparable housing within the entire metropolitan area).
This suggested limitation of Moore is not persuasive. First, expulsion from one's
home, even though comparable housing might be available locally, is a sanction sufficiently serious to warrant legal recognition and constitutional protection. Second, a
holding that prescribes only city- or county-wide age restrictions leads to the anomalous result that a giant subdivision with a population of 30,000 might validly be designated an age-restricted community, whereas a small town with a population of
10,000 could not be so limited.
126. 431 U.S. at 500.
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tiffs' challenge would be sustained on slightly different grounds from
Moore. First, the purpose of avoiding the imposition of additional
financial burdens on taxpayers might be found to be beyond the
police power. More likely, such a fiscal motive could be found
to be not sufficiently "important" or "compelling" to outweigh the
"fundamental" right of older-excludee plaintiffs to be free in matters
of procreation and to make private decisions about family living
arrangements.
The town's other justification for the age-restrictive zoning provision would be the supposed purpose of increasing the available
housing supply for the elderly. Age-restrictive measures, as they
relate to the older excludees, serve this goal only very indirectly
at best, since the exclusion of below-age spouses does nothing to
increase housing opportunities for older people. In fact, the ban
on young spouses is linked to the goal only to the extent that older
residents marry fellow-agers because of the restrictions, a result
that seems improbable. Neither does the exclusion of older persons
who live with young children advance the stated purpose of increasing the housing supply for elderly housing consumers. Perhaps the
ban on children might make hou~ing more affordable by forestalling
tax increases connected with school expansion. But again, ends and
means are only tenuously linked. 127
127. Another justification that the defendant township might offer is that minimum age restrictions are necessary to achieve the living environment most satisfying
to the elderly. Minimum age restrictions effectively eliminate the noise, traffic, and
commotion commonly associated with children and younger adults, disturbances
which at least some elderly persons find greatly annoying. Similarly, it may be painful for the retired elderly person to be directly reminded of his own now-lost youth,
or to accept that the younger and more vigorous must be permitted to lead in the
community. Age-restrictive zoning clearly serves to insulate the elderly from these
possibly unpleasant contacts. Given this line or argument, the asserted interest behind
age-restrictive zoning becomes in some sense aesthetic. The state seeks not only to
provide the elderly with housing, but also to see that they live in peace and tranquility.
An essentially similar purpose, though directed toward an entire community
rather than simply a development for the elderly, was acknowledged by the Court
to be legitimate in Belle Terre. Those presumably affected by the statute were, like
the actual plaintiffs in the case, students or other more or less transient young adults.
The fact that the ordinance was designed to preserve Belle Terre's tranquil character
by excluding those deemed most likely to disrupt it did not persuade the Court that
the village had exceeded its authority. In affirming this aesthetic dimension to the
village's zoning power, the Court stated:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . • •
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and
the blessings of quite seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
people.
416 U.S. at 9.
If, as seems likely, the Court were to accept the legitimacy of the aesthetic inter-
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To summarize, older excludees denied residency under the agerestrictive zoning ordinance as a result of the family arrangements
they have formed can claim· that their fundamental rights of familial
association and privacy have been infringed. This claim is strongly
supported by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moore. Since
excludees have invoked a fundamental right, it is unlikely that the
ordinance can be justified. Thus, as applied to older excludees,
age-restrictive zoning ordinances appear to be unconstitutional.
ill.

VALIDITY OF AGE-RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Residential age limitations are imposed in some retirement communities through a scheme of private restrictive covenants or declarations rather than by zoning legislation. These privately imposed
restrictions raise the issue whether the fourteenth amendment can
be employed to bar their enforcement, at least against older excludees.128
The Civil Rights Caoes129 established the proposition that the
constraints of the fourteenth amendment apply only to "state acest served by age-restrictive zoning in light of Moore, the question would become
whether it would also find it to be "compelling." Since it seems difficult to argue
that there is not at least a very high correlation between youth and the types of activity that the elderly may find disturbing, a challenge to the validity of the ordinance
would focus not so much on the sufficiency of the relationship between means and
ends as on whether the ends are so compelling as to justify the ordinance's infringement on family privacy rights.
Although the issue was not directly addressed in Moore, that case, when read in
conjunction with Belle Terre, seems clearly to limit the state's power to zone in
favor of certain intangible interests at the point where such zoning intrudes on family
privacy. Of course, the East Cleveland ordinance was also deficient, as was emphasized in Justice Powell's plurality opinion, in that it drew illogical distinctions between various family groupings and seemed based on the assumption that the type
of family rather than its size indicated its capacity for increasing traffic or otherwise
disturbing the community. But, while this perhaps would offer the Court a basis for
distinguishing the questions presented by the East Cleveland ordinance from the agerestrictive zoning ordinance, the importance the Court attached to the family rights
found violated in Moore argues strongly that the distinction would be deemed insubstantial. More directly, if the right of family members to live with one another as
they please can be limited simply by findings that exercise of the choice impairs the
serenity of their neighbors, then the right cannot fairly be termed fundamental.
128. Only one reported case has dealt with the enforceability of age-restrictive
covenants. In Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974), the young
defendants purchased a mobile home in a subdivision and resided there with two children despite a restrictive covenant containing a minimum age provision for occupancy.
The Arizona Court of Appeals simply assumed the presence of state action in finding
the deed restriction to be constitutionally valid. The court rejected both the claims
that the provision was unenforceably vague and violated public policy and the
equitable defenses of unclean hands and changed circumstances. The case is analY,zed
in Note, Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Against Children: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 17 Aruz. L. REv. 717 (1975).
129. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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tion,'' as opposed to purely "private" conduct. Though simple to
state, the proposition has proved .troublesome and vagarious in its
application, likely because it seeks to define such fundamental
politica) constructs as the limit on federal interference with state
conduct and even on governmental intervention into private conduct.
Thus the definitions of what is "state" and what is "private" action
have developed over the years in a pattern that is not entirely coherent or logical, and· is probably best explained by an examination
of the underlying political considerations. Although a comprehensive overview of the concept of state action is beyond the scope of
this work, certain generalities will be hazarded about what doesand does not-constitute "state action,'' so that an inquiry can be
made into whether the fourteenth amendment's requirements of
fairness and equality apply to age-restrictive covenants.
One proposition that is now undisputed is that the fourteenth
amendment does not apply only to actions initiated by the state.
As the Supreme Court declared in one of its more recent pronouncements on the question, "Our cases make clear that the impetus for
the forbidden discrimination need not originate with the state if
it is state action that enforces privately originated discrimination." 130
Out of this basic notion have come three more or less distinct
theories that account for judicial findings of "state action" in cases
involving the "non-obvious involvement of the state in private conduct."131 The first two theories focus on the state and its involvement or relationship with the entity that made the challenged action.
One is the "state contacts" theory: state action may be found where
the private entity is dependent upon the state for its existence, is
heavily regulated by the state, or exists in a symbiotic relationship
with the state.
An examination of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area
indicates, however, that its view of the state contacts theory has
become increasingly restrictive. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 132 the case from which the theory first developed, the
Court found state action in a private restaurant's refusal to serve
black patrons. The Court's decision focused upon the facts that
the restaurant was located in a parking building owned by the
Wilmington Parking Authority, a state agency, that the restaurant
was the Authority's lessee, and that the Authority used rent paid
130. _Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).
131. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
132. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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by the restaurant to defray certain· expenses arising out of the operation of the building. In the next state contacts case, however, Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 133 the Court refused to expand the theory's
application, as it found no state action where a private club operating under a state liquor license refused to serve a black guest solely
because of his race. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,134 the
most recent of the state contacts cases, construes the theory even
more narrowly. In that decision, the Court held that no state
action existed where a heavily regulated, state licensed, privately
owned electric utility company that enjoyed state-created monopoly
status and enforced tariff regulations promulgated by the company
but authorized and approved by- the state terminated service to the
petitioner allegedly without notice or hearing. 135
The other theory_ of state action that focuses on the state's
relationship with the private entity developed from a line of Supreme
Court decisions beginning with Marsh v. Alabama.136 According to
this theory, if the private entity is performing what is traditionally
considered to be a "public function"-i.e., one associated with government and sovereignty-the actions of that private entity are
"state action" embraced by the restrictions and limitations of the
fourteenth amendment. In the famous Marsh case, the Court held
that a corporate property owner, the proprietor of an old-fashioned
company town, was constrained by the provisions of the first and
fourteenth amendments, since the privately owned town was "built
and operated primarily to benefit the public and since [its] operation is essentially a public function." 137 The Court's more recent
development of this theory, which has occurred principally in a series
of shopping center cases, again indicates a trend toward a restrictive definition of state action. 138 The Court has now rejected the
claim, based on Marsh, that large, modern, suburban shopping
centers have replaced the traditional central business district and
133. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
134. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
135. Justice Douglas dissented in Metropolitan Edison on the grounds that the
. company's actions were "sufficiently intertwined with those of the State" and "sufficiently buttressed by state law" to constitute state action. 419 U.S. at 362 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
136. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
137. 326 U.S. at 506.
138. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972); Food Employees ·Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968). See also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1965).
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thus perform an equivalent public function. In the most recent
case in this line, Hudgens v. NLRB, 139 the Court found no state
action-and thus no violation of the first and fourteenth amendments-in the decision by the proprietor of a large shopping center
to prohibit peaceful labor picketing on the premises. 140
A third discernible theory of state action focuse_s not so much
on the state's role and relationship with the private entity as upon
the substance of the challenged private action itself. This theory,
propounded in Shelley v. Kraemer, 141 has seen very little development
in the case law, perhaps because it carries implications of virtually
limitless governmental intervention into what has traditionally been
considered purely private, individual conduct. In particular, the
Shelley doctrine says that judicial enforcement of a racially discriminatory private agreement142 is constitutionally impermissible.
Here the constitutional constraints are applied not because of the
state's special relation to the acting entity or because the private
action is essentially "governmental" in character, but for some other
reason that has proved to be difficult to isolate and identify with
any degree of precision. 143 Whatever the exact rationale and scope
of Shelley, the Supreme Court has never extended the case to render
constitutionally unenforceable any private discrimination drawn on
nonracial grounds. 144
139. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
140. In Hudgens, the Court expressly overruled its decision in Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), which had been extensively but unconvincingly distinguished in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972). 424 U.S. at 517-20. The Court remanded Hudgens to the court of appeals
with directions to remand the case to the National Labor Relations Board for consideration under the National Labor Relations Act alone, without reference to the
first amendment. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the
grounds that the case should have been decided on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds and that Logan Valley should not be overruled. 424 U.S. at 525 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
141. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
142. The prohibited judicial enforcement includes not only the injunctive relief
barred in Kraemer but awards of money damages as well. Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
143. For examples of various attempts to formulate a rationale, see Henkin,
Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV, 473 (1962);
Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REV, 1083 (1960); Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959);
Pollak, Racial Di~crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
144. See, e.g., Black v. CUtter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), in which the
Supreme Court declined to overturn a decision of the Supreme Court of California
construing a collective bargaining agreement to render Communist Party membership
"just cause" for an employee's dismissal. The Court viewed the California decision
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In order to assess the relation of the state action theories to the
validity of privately imposed residential age restrictions, it might
be useful to posit a hypothetical situation. Suppose that a real estate
developer offers a large number of dwelling units for sale pursuant
to a scheme of development that includes express restrictions on age.
The restrictions may be imposed in the deeds to individual units
or, in a condominium offering, in the declaration of condominium
and the individual deeds. It is reasonable to assume that, pursuant
to the local government's exercise of its state-delegated authority
to regulate land subdivision or condominium development, the developer has been required to obtain authorization from several local
governmental offices before proceeding with the development. The
local government has likely demanded certain concessions from' the
developer--for example, the dedication of land for streets, schools,
or parks-as a condition of its approval of the project. The developer might also be subject to state "blue sky" legislation, which
regulates the offering of the subdivided lots or condominium units
for sale and makes state approval of the terms of the offering a
precondition of sale. Consumer protection measures of this sort
usually require the filing of a registration statement with the' state's
real estate department that sets forth the elements of the development scheme, including the plan to impose age limitations. In sum,
the hypothetical developer is subjected to extensive governmental
regulation and is in fact dependent upon governmental approval for
the success of the project.
Given the present state of the case law, it seems unlikely that
a court would find state action under the state contacts theory in
the developer's imposition of age restrictions on pccupancy. Of the
state contacts cases, Burton provides the most support for such a
finding since in that case the state agency knowingly allowed racial
discrimination to be carried out by a private instrumentality when
the agency could have easily prevented it as an administrative matter.
The developer hypothetical is similar to Burton in that the state
or local government could prevent the discrimination agaip.st young
persons by denying permission to develop and sell the units unless
the age restrictions were removed. Moreover, in both Burton and
the hypothetical case the level of contacts between the state and the

.

solely as a matter of contract construction under local law and found no substantial
federal question presented. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justice Black, dissented on the ground that the state court's action invoked the Shelley
v. Kraemer principle. 351 U.S. at 302.
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private entity is high, in the developer situation as a result of extensive governmental regulation and in Burton because of the landlordtenant relationship existing between the parking authority and the
restaurant.
Chances are, however, that an argument based on the Burton
precedent would not prevail in the hypothetical case, since there are
important distinctions between the cases. In Moose Lodge, the Court
distinguished Burton by noting that a relationship of mutual advantages between the government and the private entity might be
required to find state action:
Here there is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee that was present in Burton, where the private
lessee obtained the benefit of locating in a building owned by the
state-created parking authority, and the parking authority was enabled to carry out its primary public purpose of f umishing parking
space by advantageously leasing portions of the building constructed
for that purpose to commercial lessees such as the owner of the
Eagle Restaurant. 145
No such mutually beneficial relationship exists in the developer
case, where, as in Moose Lodge, the state does not derive any direct
benefit from the developer's activity. 146 Also, Burton involved racial
discrimination, a fact that might have led the Court to impose
responsibility on the state. The Court might view nonracial limitations of the type imposed by the developer with less hostility and
suspicion. Moreover, the Court's later decisions in Moose Lodge
and Metropoltian Edison have circumscribed the Burton precedent.
Moose Lodge is relevant to the developer hypothetical because it
holds that state licensing is by itself an insufficient contact for state
action. In Metropolitan Edison, the Court refused to find state
action in the face of extensive state involvement that included
licensing, regulation, and even granting the private entity a monopoly
for the provision to the public of an essential service. Thus, even
though the state's regulatory contacts with the residential land developer are extensive-more extensive, perhaps, than in Moose
Lodge-they still do not rise to the level found insufficient for state
action in Metropolitan Edison. As a result, the state contacts theory
145. 407 U.S. at 175.
146. Though it is, of course, possible that the town in which an age-restricted
development is located might gain increased tax revenues or other growth-related
advantages, such benefits would appear to be incidental in comparison with the income received from the leasing of state-owned lands to a private commercial enterprise.
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will not support a finding of state action in the developer's imposition
of age restrictions.
The public function rationale affords little more basis for a
finding ·of state action. In support of the imposition of constitutional
constraints, a claim could be made under this theory that the adoption of private use restrictions in connection with land development
is the functional equivalent of zoning-the public regulation of land
use-with the private developer standing in the shoes of_ the local
government. Certainly private land use limitations greatly concern
the public interest and have an important cumulative impact on
the nature and quality of our cities and towns. Also, it appears
that the larger the development, the more the privately created
scheme of land use restrictions takes on the character of zoning
legislation, which typically affects whole districts covering relatively
large land areas.
But under current case law these considerations are probably
insufficient to bring the developer's actions under the same constitutional constraints that restrict the local government. In the shopping
center cases culminating with Hudgens, the Court effectively limited
Marsh to its facts and sharply curtailed the public function theory
as a basis for governmental regulation of action that is formally
private. Hudgens clearly demonstrates both the Court's reluctance
to expand the range of federal control and its concern for the right
of an owner to exercise broad authority over the use of his private
property.147 These conservative instincts would almost surely preclude a finding of state action when a private land developer imposes
an age restriction on residential use. Not only would that finding
circumscribe the owner's control of his private property, but it
would also create endless new opportunities for litigation. If the
Court were to find that private land development was invested with
a governmental charaoter, then all the private deed restrictions
common to residential subdivision schemes might be subject to
constitutional challenge. Size, height, and setback limitations, aesthetic requirements like sign control and architectural review, and
amenity provisions like the obligation to maintain common areas
might all be attacked as discriminatory or unreasonable under the
fourteenth amendment. The cases indicate the Court's unwillingness to extend constitutional limitations-and thus the scope of
147. The Court quoted from the· Logan Valley dissent of Justice Black: ''The
question is, Under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it
were public?" 424 U.S. at 516 (quoting 391 U.S. at 332).
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governmental intervention into private decisionmaking-to that
degree.
An argument based on Shelley v. Kraemer seems the least likely
of the three to support a finding that the residential land developer's
imposition of age restrictions constitutes state action. Simply put,
the Shelley principle, with its potential for vast escalation of
federal interference with private conduct, has never been extended
beyond private discrimination based on race-the evil to which
the fourteenth amendment was originally directed. Thus, it is unlikely that any court would hold that judicial enforcement of a
privately imposed minimum age limitation would expose that limita.tion to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. 148
Finally, it is important to note that persons seeking to enforce
private age restrictions are in a position to invoke constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of their own. As one commentator has
observed, ~nforcement of a discriminatory private agreement requires the court to choose between competing claims of equality
and liberty. 149 Opposing the defendants' assertions of the right to
equal treatment in obtaining a residence, the plaintiffs in these
covenant actions will claim "the freedom to choose one's neighbors,
to make contracts and have them enforced, to deal with whom one
chooses . . . to be whimsical, sentimental, irrational, capricious."1110
148. A fuJ1her development should be noted in connection with state action and
enforcement of residential age restrictions. At least one state--Arizona-has passed
legislation to aid in the enforcement of privately created age limitations. The
Arizona provision, an amendment to the state's residential landlord and tenant act,
makes it illegal for a person to rent his property in circumstances that, were the
transaction a sale, would constitute a violation of a covenant against the sale of the
property to persons who have a child or children living with them. Aruz. REV, STAT.
§§ 33-303(B), -1317(B) (Supp. 1976). Additionally, the measure prohibits a person from renting to people with children, even in the absence of an age-restrictive
covenant, in a subdivision "presently designed, advertised and used as an exclusive
adult subdivision." Id. Violation of the statute is made punishable by fine and,
for repeated offenses, by fine and imprisonment. No cause of action for violation
of the provision is granted to private parties, and there are no recorded cases in which
the state has prosecuted violators under the statute.
A prosecution by the state under the statute would be state action, of course, and
thus would present serious constitutional questions. The measure discriminates
against persons not on the basis of age, but on account of family status-that is,
whether they have children living with them determines their eligibility to rent. In
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Moore and the other cases noted above in
connection with the rights of older excludees, see notes 98-12S supra and accompanying text, the class excluded by the Arizona statute could invoke the compelling state
interest standard by claiming infringement upon fundamental privacy rights. Property owners might also claim that the measure unreasonably interferes with their
fourteenth amendment property rights by severely diminishing the class of persons
to whom they can rent. But see note 97 supra.
149. Henkin, supra note 143, at 488.
150, Id.
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Specifically, the plaintiffs' claim is that the court's refusal to enforce
the private age limitation would be state action denying them rights
of contract and association protected by the Constitution.
How the court would resolve the conflict between liberty and
equality in the area of private age limitations has already been
addressed in the analysis of the application of the state action doctrine to these restrictions. To the extent that the courts have
decided to favor the claim of equality over the freedom to discriminate, they have found state action in what is formaJly private conduct and then applied the strictures of the equal protection clause
to that conduct. Shelley v. Kraemer is a clear example of this
result. 151 Under present case law, however, it seems unlikely that
a cour~ would find state action in the imposition of private age
restrictions. That conclusion, coupled with the demonstrated willing.ness of courts in the zoning cases to endorse residential age limitations as beneficial, suggests that the plaintiffs' invocation of liberty
and property rights will lead to enforcement of private age-restrictive
covenants.152
. IV.·

CONCLUSION

The planned retirement community has emerged as a significant
element in the national housing picture. Residential age restrictions
are imposed in connection with the development of most retirement
communities, either by zoning ordinance or private covenant. The
restrictions uniformly exclude school-age children from residency.
Many establish a minimum age for occupancy, typically fifty-two or
fifty-five, sometimes with exceptions for a spouse, a domestic employee under the minimum age, or for children beyond high-school
age.
Several recent cases, including d~cisions from the New York
Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme Court, have sustained
the validity of age-restrictive zoning ordinances against attack on
statutory and constitutional grounds. Although brought by residents
and taxpayers who own property near the area designated in the
ordinance as a retirement district, the cases have turned on the
personal rights of young persons excluded from occupancy. The
cases show that age-restrictive zoning can withstand challenge by
or on. behalf of young excludees on equal protection and due process
151. Even absent state action, liberty and property claims will not guarantee a
freedom to discriminate on the basis of race. See, e.g., Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi,
326 U.S. 88 (1945).
152. As with other restrictive covenants, enforcement of private age restrictio~
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grounds. Young-agers do not constitute a suspect class and cannot
assert fundamental privacy, association, or travel rights sufficient
to invoke the court's strict scrutiny and the suspension of the presumpt~on of legislative validity. As applied to young excludees,
age-restrictive zoning provisions have been justified as measures
designed to increase the supply of housing for the elderly, although
some have appeared to be aimed instead at increasing the housing
supply for relatively affluent middle-agers.
Age-restrictive zoning ordinances, however, operate to exclude
persons on the basis of their family status as well as because of their
age. Thus, an older person will be barred when he lives with a
school-age child or, depending upon the ordinance, with a young
spouse. The rights of older excludees have not been asserted or determined in any case. But on the basis of current Supreme Court case
law, it appears that age-restrictive zoning ordinances are unconstitutional when enforced against older excludees, since the measures intrude upon fundamental rights of privacy and association involving
marriage and the family. As applied to older excludees, these restrictions at best serve only indirectly to achieve the goal of increasing
the housing supply for the elderly, and thus they could not withstand
challenge by these plaintiffs, especially if the compelling state interest
standard were adopted.
· As for privately imposed residential age limitations, the threshold
validity question is whether constitutional strictures can be applied
might be defeated by the assertion of certain nonconstitutional defenses, such as the
traditional equitable defenses of unclean hands, !aches, acquiescence, and changed circumstances. See REsTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF PROPER1Y §§ 560-62, 564 (1944);
2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPER1Y §§ 9.38-.39 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 POWELL ON
REAL PROPER1Y, §§ 683-84 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1974). Although the traditional view
is that equitable defenses are available only when injunctive relief is sought and thus
cannot be asserted in an action for damages, RESTATEMENT, supra §§ 561, comment
d; 562, comment c; 563, comment b, others have taken the position that a defense
sufficient in equity should also be sufficient at law to bar enforcement of the promise,
5 POWELL, supra § 684.
For example, in actions to enjoin the sale or rental of property in the retirement
community to young persons, the defendant property owners might claim the common-law defense that minimum age restrictions on occupancy constitute an indirect
but effective and unreasonable restraint on alienation. See RESTATEMENT, supra §
406, comment c. This argument parallels the fourteenth amendment property rights
claim of defendant property owners in age-restrictive zoning cases, see text at notes
95-97 supra, and probably has as little chance of success so long as there is sufficient
demand for retirement community living among eligible older persons. The zoning
cases, though decided on constitutional grounds, demonstrate the courts' willingness
to find a worthwhile purpose behind the imposition of residential age restrictions, a
factor that is an important determinant of the reasonableness of the restraint, see RESTATEMENT, supra § 406, comment i.
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to bar their enforcement, at least against older excludees. None of
the theories of state action seems to support application of the
fourteenth amendment to private age restrictions. Thus, unless
facts are present giving rise to one of the traditional equitable defenses, it appears that private age restrictions are legally enforceable.

